Christopher Jay

I am currently writing a book about ineffable knowledge, in which I argue that if there is such a thing as philosophically interesting mystical insight (which might be insight into the way language or representation works, as Wittgenstein thought, or insight into anything else - so, not just religious insight which has traditionally been the locus of philosophical discussions of 'mysticism'), it is propositional knowledge of ineffable truths. (I am interested in exploring the options - but I am by no means convinced that there is any such thing.) The project involves showing how many of the metaphysical theories of propositions we have leave room for ineffable ones (and hence ineffable truths), and also involves putting some pressure on arguments which purport to show that there is no limit to the expressive power of language, in principle. Although the most prominent recent discussions of ineffable knowledge have disavowed ineffable propositional knowledge, I think this disavowal is premature, and that ineffable propositional knowledge affords us very natural accounts of ineffable insight's inferential and cognitive roles, drawing on our most familiar theories. And it invites complementary accounts of ineffable beliefs (including false ones), ineffable hopes and desires, and other ineffable 'propositional' attitudes (which really are propositional, on my account).

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My interest in ineffability originally arose out of my longstanding fascination with transcendental idealism, particularly in Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein but most especially in Kant. In work which will probably remain outside the book project, I am trying to think about how the notion of acquaintance might be the key to understanding our relationship with the ineffable thing in itself (an idea which I benefited from discussing with my former student Niamh Williams, who wrote a good MA dissertation on the idea). And I might have some things to say about the 'Limit Argument' which recurs throughout the history of work on the ineffable, perhaps most famously in the Preface of the Tractatus, and which is reconstructed nicely by A. W. Moore in various places (including his The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics, e.g. p. 135), but which I think has less to it than is often thought. I am still working through the issues here, trying to write some things, and would be delighted to discuss them with anyone who is interested, because I've got a lot more learning and thinking to do! 

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I recently finished a paper on treating like cases alike.​

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The 'practicality' or supposed 'action-guidingness' of morality and of normativity more generally interests me very much (I think it is widely overestimated, and anyway often not particularly well conceptualised). That shows up in a couple of the things I've published, on the ought implies can principle and on the idea that justice has a kind of possibility constraint. But I am still thinking and, sometimes, writing about it. 'Violability and Practical Deliberation' is a draft arguing that obligation does not require the possibility of non-compliance (pace Kant and others), and unpicking some of what is meant by talk of action guiding. (It is still a work in progress, and I will probably re-write the action guiding section in line with this talk version.)

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I have been working for a long time, on and off (mostly off), on a couple of papers on aspects of Kant's moral philosophy. One of them, interpreting and defending Kant's Doctrine of the Highest Good, has been given as a talk a few times. The other, interpreting, revising and then defending Kant's views about differential responsibility for the consequences of our lies and of our truth telling, is in a less complete state.

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One of my favourite things I've written (although nobody's ever wanted to publish it - yet?) is 'Sins of Permission', which explores the wrong of permissiveness and suggests that permissiveness might explain the morally problematic nature of various things, such as markets in certain goods and violent sports.

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I think we can probably hope for things which we believe to be impossible (and that doing so might even be rational), which is denied by many. 'Hoping for the Believed Impossible' needs some re-working, but starts to defend that view (developing a suggestion I made very briefly in a footnote of 'Doxastic and Nondoxastic Atheisms'). 

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A while back, I went through a phase of thinking and writing about issues in economic and policy ethics, prompted by what struck me as mistakes in debates about various things in the public sphere and in policy research. I am hoping to finish a paper on the moral justification of progressive tax rates, which I've given as a talk a few times. I've got a draft on 'A Fallacy in Some Reciprocity Arguments for Welfare Conditionality'. I've also written something critical of 'The Waste Argument' (an argument perhaps more often endorsed by non-philosophers, but in need of correction, I think). And I wrote up the obvious thing to say about 'Justifying Public Health Measures: Citizens' Rights and A Non-Consequentialist Argument' in the wake of the COVID pandemic. ​​​​

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Then there is 'Some Medieval Arguments Against Usury', which is a long piece with some reconstructive and critical work going on, but also lots of explanation drawn mostly from secondary sources, making it an unwieldy beast betwixt guide for students and (too long) research paper.